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AcTIoN.

Right of action-whetherit is extinguished by a payment by a thiLrd
person.-Where A. is primarily liable, and B. only secondarily, A. may
still be sued for the benefit of B., though B. has paid the debt.: Am.
Express Co. v. Haggard,37 Ills.
Thus where a package of money sent by express was never received
by the one to whom it was sent, but was receipted for by his clerk
through mistake, the father of the clerk, on being apprised of the circumstances, paid the amount of the lpss to the owner. It was held this
payment was not for the benefit of the express compahy, and discharged
no right of action which existed against them. The owner might stfll
sue the company to recover the money lost, for the use of the father of
the clerk, and the clerk was a competent witness in such action: Id.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

Liability of Assignees.-Where the assignees of a lessee leased the
premises for the best price they could obtain, and paid to the landlord
all that they received, which was accepted by him, and. they surrendered
the possession: Held, that the assignees, having fully administered and
paid out according to the terms of the assignment, all the moneys they
had received from the assigned estate, could at most only be charged,
.ersonally, with the value of the use and occupation of the premises:
and that evidence to determine that value should have been received:
Jermain v. 1-attison, 46 Barb.
The liability of assignees under an assignment.for the benefit of creditors, is to be determined by the same rule which applies to executors,
under similar circumstances, it seems: Id.
CORPORATION.

To wiat Extent liabiefbr the Acts of their Emp7hijees.-All corpora-tions act -by and through their agents, for whose acts, in the line of their
business, the corporation appointing them are held liable. A corporation
will be held responsible for the unlawful acts of its employees or agents,
which include wilful injuries, or injuries resulting from gross negligence:
.ill. Central Railroad Co. v. Read, 37 Ills.
The distinction made by the New York courts, between the negligence of the corporation, acting through its president and board of
directors, and the negligence of its employees or servants and agents,
isnot recognised in this state: Id.
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Subscription to Stock.-Defendant subscribed to the capital stock for
the purpose of building a seminary, and delivered his subscription to the
plaintiff-the seminary incorporation. The seminary buildings were
built, and the defendant refused to pay his subscription. Suit was commenced by plaintiff to recover the same. Beld, that the delivery of the
subscription to the plaintiff, the demand of payment, and the subsequent.
suit to recover the same, were sufficient evidence of acceptance by the
plaintiff: Richmondville Union Seminary v. McDonald, 34 N. Y.
Held, also, that the obligation resting on the corporation to issue stock
to the defendant to the amount of his subscription, and his consequent
power to control the corporation to that extent, constituted a sufficient
consideration for his promise to pay it: Id.
CRImmiAT. LAW.

.ndictment.-Where the accused is indicted in the county in which
he is apprehended, for an unlawful marriage in another county, the
indictment must show his apprehension in the county in which he is
indicted; that being a fact indispensable to authorize ths Court of Sessions of the latter county to try the accused: REouser v. 1e People, 46
Barb.
It is not enough that this jurisdictional fact is stated in the caption to
the indictment, or record of conviction; for the reason that it is not a
fact of which the Court of Sessions can take judicial notice: dThe omission of such an averment, in the indictment, is not a defect
of form, but of substance. It is a material defect, and is not cured by
the statute (3 R. S., 5th ed., p. 1019, § 54): Id.
False Pretences.-In an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, it is sufficient to-state, negate, and prove one false pretence-; and
the materiality and influence of such pretence is a question for the jury
unless, upon the face of the indictment, the pretence appears clearly to
be immaterial: Thomas v. The People, 34: N. Y.
It is sufficient if, upon the face of the indictment, a false pretence is
alleged which is capable of defrauding by inducing a credit &c.: per
WRIGHT, J.: Id.

,

Quit-claim Deeds-What will pass thereby.-While a quit-claim deed
is as effective to pass title as a deed of bargain and sale, still, like all
other contracts, it must be expounded and enforced according to the
intention of the parties, so as to pass only such land as would be properly embraced in the language used: Hamilton v. Dootile, 37 Ills.
If the words used in the quit-claim deed indicate an intention on the
part of the grantor, to pass only such land as he owns at the time of its
execution, then lands embraced in a prior valid deed-will Le held to be
reserved from its operation, and will not pass thereby, although the prior
deed remains unrecorded: .d.
But a prior deed which is void, or even voidable, is not regarded as
embraced in such a reservation in a subsequent quit-claim deed ; and
the subsequent deed will; in such case, be upheld as binding, and sufficient to pass the title as against the prior conveyance : Id.
Or. where the prior deed is so insufficiently executed, as regards the
certificate of acknowledgment, that its execution cannot be proven
thereby, and its execution cannot be otherwise proven so that it can be

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

admitted in evidence as a conveyance, it cannot be held to constitute a
conveyance, and so will not control the operation of a subsequent quitclaim deed, which was designed to pass all the lands owned by the
grantor at the time of its execution: Id.
ESTOPPE.

Requisites of-In order to create an estoppel in pas,the declarations
or acts relied upon must have been accompanied by a design to induce
the party who sets up the estoppel to act upon them : Andrews v. Lyjons,
11 Allen.
EVIDENCE.

Statements of Patientto his Physician.-The statements of a patient
to his physician as to the character and seat of his sensations, made for
the purpose of receiving medical advice, are competent evidence in his
favor, in an action to recover damages for a personal injury, even though
such statements were not made till after the action was brought: Barber
and Wife v. Merriam, 11 Allen.
Declarationsof a Party.-The declarations of a party in possession
are admissible in evidence against the party making them, or his privies
in blood and estate: Gibney v- .larclhay, 34 N. Y.
But such declarations are not competent as evidence to attack or
destroy the title which is of record, &c. : per HUNT, J.-Zd.'
Books of Account.-After a physician has proved an employment,
professionally, the entries in his book, of the visits, may be received, to
show the number of visits: Clarke v. Smith, Ex'r., &c., 46 Barb.
Such book is evidence of nothing else; and for this purpose it is not
necessary, as in other cases, where books are admitted in evidence, to
prove that the plaintiff keeps correct books, or that others have settled
by them: id.
The objection that the alteration in the law admitting parties as witnesses has rendered the books unnecessary as evidence, even if it had
that effect in other cases, does not apply where the other party is dead;
because in such a case he cannot testify: Id.
Declarationsor Admissions of Assignors.--Declarations of the assignos of goods, made subsequent to the assignment, and after they have
parted with the possession of the assigned property,'are not competent
evidence for parties sued by the assignees, for taking and selling the
goods under and by virtue of a judgment and execution against the
assignors: Peck el al. v. Crduse et al., 46 Baib.
Declarations or admissions respecting 'the assigned property, thus
made, by th6 assignors, after they have ceased to have any control over
the goods, are not a part of the s-es gestc, but only mere hearsay, and
therefore are not competent evidence against the assignees, or the creditors whom they represent: Id.
Where the declarations or admissions relate to the intentions of the
assignors-the secret operations' of their minds-and not to anything
they said to the assignees, the fact that one of the assignees was present
and heard the declarations or admissions without denying their truth,
will not make them binding upon the assignees, or evidence against
them: Id.
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Of Assignors' Intention.-What assignors did, before making an
assignment, in contemplation of making it, is evidence upon the question of their intention in making it, proper for the consideration of the
jury: Id.
The rule is well settled that where the validity of a sale or assignment
of goods depends upon whether it was made with intent to binder, delay,or defraud creditors, the judge is bound to submit the case to the
jury: Id.
Admissions or Declarationsof Parties.-The admissions or declarations of parties are competent evidence against them where parol evidence
of the fact sought to be shown by such admissions or declarations would
be competent: Keator v. Dimmick, 46 Barb.
Declarations of one in Possession, or having Title to Land.-The
declarations of a person in the possession of land, as to his title, are
admissible evidence against persons claiming under him, who subsequently come into the possession of the land : I1.
The rule that parol declarations of a person having title to land are
inadmissible as evidence to defeat that title, only excludes declarations
when th6 fact sought to be established by them cannot be proved by
parol evidence: Id.
The declarations of a grantee in a deed, in respect to the time when
the deed was delivered to him, made while he was in possession of the
farm conveyed, are competent evidence, in an action of ejectment for
dower, against a person claiming title to the land under such grantee:
Id.
EXECUTOR.

Jurisdiction in Equity to compel Account.-One of two executors
may maintain an action in equity, to call his co-executor to an account:
Wood, Executor, v. Brown, his Co-Executor, 84 N. Y.
Although the complaint is inartificially framed to compel an accounting, if the facts stated plainly show that it is a case where the defendant
should render an account, the court may compel an accounting under
the prayer for general relief: Id.
The creditors, legatees, and next of kin are not necessary parties,
except in case of a final accounting: Idi
Where the trusts under a will vested in the executor are distinguishable from those attached to his office, the court may dismiss him as to
the former, and not as to the latter. But if one of several executors is
guilty of misconduct in his dealings with the estate, the court will interfere, in a proper case, to regulate his conduct and compel him to place
the notes, bonds, and other securities in his possession belonging to the
estate, in such custody as to enable his co-executors to obtain access to
the same; and may direct the mode in which he shall co-operate with
his co-executors in discharging his duties as executor under the
will: Id.
It seems the surrogate is authorized, under the statutes of this state,
upon an accounting by the executor, to administer the same remedy: Id.
EXPRESS COMPANY.

Delivery,of Goods- What constitues.-A delivery of a package by
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an express company, to discharge the company, must be actual and
bondfide, and not merely formal: Am. Express Co. v. Haggard,37 Ill.
So, if the agent of the company abstracts a parcel while in the act of
delivering it, it is no delivery, and the company will be liable even
though a receipt be signed and the form of delivery gone through, by
the agent's laying the property for a moment out of his hands: Id.
FRAUD.

Trust ex malefici.-A fraudulent use of the statutes for the prevention of frauds, &c., will not be permitted; and a court of equity will
interfere against a party intending to make such statute an instrument
of fraud: Ryan et al. v. Dox, 84 N. Y.
Where a purchaser under a foreclosure sale undertakes to purchase
for the benefit of the mortgagor, and thus acquires the title at a price
greatly below its value, he will be deemed the trustee of the party for
whom he has undertaken the purchase, and, on tender to him of the
purchase-money and interest, he will be compelled to cpnvey the property
to the party equitably entitled: Id.
It is no objection that the agreement, by which he undertook to purchase for the benefit of the owner of the equity of redemption, was not
in writing. The law makes him a trustee ex maleficio: d.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

ParolPromise to pay Profits of Sale of Real Estate.-A parol proTmise to pay to another a portion of the profits made by the promissor in
a purchase and sale of real estate is not within the Statute of Frauds;
and, if founded upon a sufficient consideration, will support au action:
Trowbridge v. Wetherbee, 11 Allen.
GOLD Corw.
Payment of.Debt in Gold without Special Contract as to Rate of
Value.-Gold dollars of United-States coin, if applied towards the payment of a debt, without any special contract.as to the rate at which they
are to be taken, cannot be treated as having any greater value than any
other currency which is a legal tender for the payment of debts; and
English sovereigns, if applied towards the payment of a debt, are to be
computed according to the real par of exchange, that is, having reference
to the gold coin of the United States: Bush and Others v. .Baldrey, 11
Allen.
GROWING CROPS.'

Title to Crops on Land of a Decedent.-The Revised Statutes, making
"growing crops" on the land of the deceased, at the time of his death,
assets in the hands of his executors, &c., have not changed the law as
to the construction of wills, in the ultimate disposition thereof: .Bradner
v. Faulkner, 34 N. Y.
Such "growing crops" now, whether bequeathed or devised, go primarily to the executor, &c., to be used, if necessary, for the payment of
debts and legacies; but if not necessary for that purpose, they go to the
beneficiary under the will: Id.
The devise of a farm, in the absence of any modifying words, now as
before the statute, carries with it the crops growing thereon: Id.
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HIGHWAY.

Rope stretched across-Liability of City for Accident.-A rope
stretched across a highway, above the ground, and attached at each end
to objects which are outside of the limits of the highway, and in temporary use, is not a defect or want of repair in the highway for which a.
city is liable to a traveller who receives an injury from coming into collision with it, while it is in motion from human agency: Barber and
Wife v. City of Roxbury, 11 Allen.
INJUNCTION.
To rdstrain a Nsance.-Where mill property has been used and
occupied by a party, and those under whom he claims, and to the same
extent., under a title and claim of right as against all the world-individuals and the public-for a period of forty years, he cannot be disturbed, or subjected to restraint, in the exercise of any of the rights
pertaining to such property, except upon the ground that it is a public
nuisance: Tge City of Rochester v.. lrickson, 46 Barb.
If it is such a nuisance, no period of use and occupancy, however
extended and uninterrupted, and under whatever claim of right, will
protect it from abatement by the public authorities, or the preventive
remedy by injunction to restrain its perpetuation by additions and
repairs : Id.
A plaintiff, asking for an injunction to restraiu the owner of a. building, situated upon the bank of a river, from erecting a foundation-wall
for the support of such building, on the ground that such building and
wall will project into the channel of the river and interrupt the natural
flow of the water, and thus constitute a public nuisance, must aflirmatively establish the fact that a nuisance will be created by the completion
of the wall, with clearness and reasonable certainty, or he will not be
entitled to that species of relief: Id.
It is not enough to make out a doubtful or possible case of danger,
but the danger apprehended must appear to be imminent, and, in the
natural course of events, clearly impending, and the mischief in its
nature and character irreparable : Id.
If it appears, in such a case, with reasonable clearness and certainty,
that the wall, and the building of which it is to form a part, occupies or
is designed to occupy any portion of the bed of the river, and will naturally and necessarily obstruct the natural flow of the water in the channel,
and in this way contribute in any considerable and appreciable degree to
the overflow of the river banks, at that point, in periods- of high water.
it is a public nuisance, and the right to an injunction, at the suit of the
city corporation, clear and unquestionable: Id.
INSURANCE.

An insurance effected by an executor, in his own name, on property
of the estate he represents, enures to the benefit of the estate, and the
insurance-money belongs to the estate, and can be sued for and recovered
by the residuary legatee: CoIburn et al. v. Lansinuj et al., 46 Barb.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Action for Use and Occupation.-In an action for use and occupation,
it is not necessary to prove the defendant to have been in manual occu-
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pation of the prenlises during the time for which recovery is sought.
If the power to occupy and enjoy is given by the landlord to the tenant, so far as the landlord is concerned, he has performed on his part,
and the action is maintainable: Ball, Executrix, v. Western Transportation Co., 34 N. Y.
Where defendants leased a barn for the term of three years, and took
possession and actually occupied the same for one year, and continued
to keep the key, but did not actually occupy: .Held, he was liable in an
action for.use and occupation: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

an action on a promissory note, brought by an assignee thereof,
the plaintiff may raise the objection that a set-off against his assignor
(the payee), averred in the answer, is barred by the Statute of Limitations: Thompson v. Sickles, 46 Barb.
The fights which the payee of a note possesses, to set up the Statute
of Limitations against a demand of the maker, urged as a set-off, may,
with great justice, be deemed an incident to the note, its principal, and
as passing with it, to the assignee thereof: Id., per CLE=RzE J.
. There is no substantial reason why the benefit of the Statute of Limitations should not be extended to the assignee or transferee of any
assignable demand, it seems: Id., per CLER E, J.
'In

MERGER.

Merger never takes place, except where the legal and equitable estate
unite in the same person; and not even then, when it is the clear intent
of all parties in interest that it shall not take place: .ascom v. Smith,
84 N. Y
PLEADING.

Plea in Abatement-Motion- Which may be resorted to.-Where a
party who is sued as a corporation, seeks to raise the question whether
the defendant is a corporation, upon matter delwrs the record, the question is one to be presented by- plea in abatement and not by. motion:
American Express Co. v. Haggard, 37 Ills: .
Plea in Abatement-Must give a better writ.-In an action against
the American Express Company, sued as a corporation, a plea in abatement was filed in the names of "Johnston Livingston, William G. Fargo,
Henry Wells and others," admitting that they, "together with others,'
were doing business -under the name by which they were sued, but
denying that the company was a corporation.. The plea was held bad,
because it did not give the plaintiff a better writ: id.
It should have set forth who were the "others" with whom Livin ston,
Fargo and Wells say they were doing business under the name of the
American Express Company, in order that the plaintiff might know
against whom to bring his suit, if the plea should prove to be true: Id.
Repi.-An answer, in an action on a promissory note, alleging a setoff against the plaintiff's assignor, does not contain a counter-claim,
requiring a reply, to put the new matter in issue: Thompson v. Sic les,
46 Barb.
joinder of Causes of Actfon.-In an action brought by the receiver
of a judgment-debtor, the subject of such action being the restitution
of the property of the judgment-debtor, the plaintiff may unite in
his complaint all the different claims which he has against the
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def'endaut, upon that subject of action, and set forth therein different
transactions out of which his right to restitution flows; although to
reach that result, in some instances, it will be necessary to set aside
transfer void for usury: Palen, Receiver, &c., v. Bushnell, 4 6 Barb.
PRACTICE.

Attachlment.-A subsequent attachment-creditor cannot move to discharge an attachment issued in a prior suit, on the ground that it was
irregularly issued.' He has no standing in court to make such a motion:
Ishtin v. Ketchnm, 46 Barb.
Where a subsequent creditor does not allege or pretend that the debt
or claim for which the first action was brought was not just and bona
.fide, nor that there was any collusion between the plaintiff and defendant in that action, he should not, on principle, be permitted to make
such a motion: 1d.
RAILROAD COMPANIES.

Free Psses-To what Extent Railroad Companies may, by special
Contract, be exempted from Liability .br linjuries to -assengers.-A
passenger, while travelling in the cars, received injuries from a collision
of trains. At the time of the accident, he was travelling under a free
pass, upon the back of which was this printed indorsement:"The person accepting this free ticket assumes all risks of accidents,
and expressly agrees that this company shall not be liable, under any
circumstances, whether of negligence of their agents, or otherwise, for
any injury to the person, or for any loss or injury to the property, of the
passenger using the ticket."
In an action on the case against the company, to recover damages for
the injuries thus received; it was held, that this agreement did not
exempt the company from liability for the gross negligence of its
employees, but it did exempt it from liability for any other species or
degree of negligence not denominated gross, or which might have the
character of recklessness. For such unavoidable accidents, as will happen to the best managed railroad trains, this agreement would be a perfect immunity to the company: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Read,
37 Ills.
Railroad companies have a right to restrict their liability as common
carriers, by such contracts as may be agreed upon specially, the companies. still remaining liable for gross negligence or wilful misfeasance,
against which good morals and public policy forbid they should be permitted to stipulate: Id.
The indorsement upon the back of this pass was not a mere notice,
like the one in Neohall's Case, 24 Ill. 466; the free ticket was a gratuity, and the acceptance and use of it established the indorsement thereon, as an agreement between the party giying and the party receiving.
By using the ticket, the passenger assents to the ternis on which it was
given, and it becomes, to all intents and purposes, an agreement: Id.
SmERIFF.
Damages in Replevn.-Where a sheriff levied upon certain articles,
on an execution against B., as his property, and an action of replevin is
brought by A., who claimed to be the owner, against the sheriff, and
where the property has been delivered to A., in the action, the recovery
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of the sheriff, upon a verdict in his favor, is not limited to the amount
of the execution on which the levy was made, but should be for the
value of the property: Buck v. Remsen, Sheriff 34 N. Y.
SHIPPING.
Bill of Lading-Evidence of the Voyage.-.--A bill of lading signed by
the master of a vessel by request of the charterers' agent, is not conclusive
evidence of the course of the voyage which the master is to pursue, if the
charter contains mutual stipulations as to the course of the voyage and
the mode in which the vessel is to be employed, and there are other
circumstances to show that the bill of lading was not intended to have
this effect: Cobb v. Blanclard and Others, 11 Allen.
If a vessel is chartered for a voyage from a port in Sicily to Boston,
with the privilege of using a second port in Sicily within certain lay
days, which are fixed, and on arriving at a port in Sicily the master
takes in part of a cargo and signs a bill of lading which is prepared for
him by the plaintiff's agent and which recites that the vessel is "bound
for Boston," and he thereupon sails at once for Boston, without waiting
for a full cargo or the expiration of the lay days, the bill of lading is
not conclusive evidence, in an action by the charterer against the owner
to recover damages for the injury caused thereby, to show that the
master was bound thus to sail at once directly for Boston, or that he
exercised good faith in so doing; but if there is evidence tending to
show the contrary, the question should be submitted to the jury: Id.
Bill of Lading.-A bill of lading can be transferred by delivery,
merely, without any indorsement or written assignment, so as to tiansfer
the property in the goods which it represents, to the holder: The .Marine
Bank of Chicago v. Wright, 46 Barb.
It was agreed between V. and W. & L. that W. & IL. should advance
money to V. to buy corn at Chicago, to be put in store and shelled, and
to be the property'of W. & L. while in store, so far as they had advanced
money on it, and to be shipped for their account, and the bill of lading
to be sent to them, and their advances reim'bursed from the proceeds
of the corn. V. purchased and shipped several cargoes of corn, and
drew on W. & L. for the amount. To procure funds to pay for the last
cargo shipped, V. drew a bill upon W. & L. for $3500, which was discounted by the plaintiff, V. at the same time delivering to the plaintiff a
duplicate bill of lading of the corn, attached to the draft: Eeld, that
no right of lien, founded on the general arrangement between V. and
W. & L.. and the payment by the latter of a larger sum by way of advances than the aggregate of V.'s purchases, could prevail against the
plaintiff's special or specific rights as the bondfide transferee of the bill
of lading: Id.
TOR.
PersonalAction.-Au action of tort in the nature of trespass quare
clausvem fr.git is a personal action and may be commenced by trustee
process. returnable in the county where the trustee lives, although that
is not the county where the land is situated: Way v. Dame and Others,
11 Allen.
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TRESPASS.

Arrest and Imprisonnient.-Intrespass, all who aid or assist are principals. Hence, one who directs the imprisonment of another is guilty
of the imprisonment: Green v. Kennedy, 46 Barb.
Where a superintendent of police tells the officer who has made an
arrest to take the prisoner back and lock him up, in contemplation of
law, he does the act which the officer does in following the direction: id.
He is not permitted to show that the act was not the consequence
of the request, which the law adjudges to be part and parcel of the act
itself: Id.
He cannot direct a trespass, and, after its 'commission, escape upon
the ground that the officer violated his duty in obeying the direction: 1d.
USURY.

Action to re'cover back Usurious lInterest.-Where a statute gives an
action to the party aggrieved, there is an interest vested in him: it is
not a personal right: Palen, Receiver, &c., v. Johnson, 46 Barb.
Hence, under the section of the statute giving to every person who
shall pay usurious interest for a loan a right of action within one year,
for the excess of interest, the receiver of a borrower, appointed in supplementary proceedings, may sue: Id.
Usurious interest cannot be recovered back, except under the statute.
If the action to recover it back is not brought within the time prescribed
by the statute, viz., one year from the time of payment, it cannot be
sustained: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Sale. of Hay by Person in Possession of Land-Re,levin.-When a
party in possession of land, claiming adversely to all others, sells to a
third party the hay cut therefrom during such occupancy, the legal title
thereto passes to his vendee, as against a party claiming title to said
premises, although not in possession: Stockwell v. Phelps, 34 N. Y.
Replevin- in the cepit can only be brought where trespass could be
maintained; and that will only lie for an injury to the land in possession of the plaintiff: Id.
WARRANTY.

Of Merchantable Quality by Broker.-A merchandise broker can
have no implied authority, from the usage of trade, to warrant goods
sold by him to be of merchantable quality; and evidence to prove such
usage is inadmissible; and a memorandum made by such broker of a
contract for the sale of goods is invalid and inadmissible in evidence,
if he has inserted therein, without express authority, a warranty by the
seller that they are of merchantable quality: Dodd and Others v. Farlow and Another, 11 Allen.
Covenant of Indemnity against Suits.-Where the covenant is one
of general indemnity merely against claims and suits, want of notice
of an existing suit against the principal does not go to the cause of
action, but the judgment is ' rinia facie evidence only against the
indemnitor; and, in a suit upon his covenants, he may be let in to show
that the principal had a good defence, which he neglected to make, to
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defeat the judgment; or that the judgment was obtained by fraud or
collusion, &c.: Bridgeport Insurance (o. v. Wilson et al., 84 N. Y.
The same rules in respect to notice, which apply to the indemnitor,
apply also to his sureties: Id.
Of Title-Voucher of Warrantor.-If one who has conveyed land
with a covenant to warrant and defend the title is vouched in by his
grantee to defend a suit brought against him by one claiming an adverse
title, he in his turn may vouch in his grantor, who conveyed the premises to him with a like covenant, to defend the same suit: Chamberlain
v. Preble, 11 Allen.
One who has been duly vouched in to defend a title which he has
covenanted to warrant and defend, will be bound by the result of the
suit., establishing the adverse title, although he did not appear therein,
and although it was decided upon an agreed statement of facts, in which
a fact was misstated, which if correctly stated would have defeated the
adverse title, provided such statement of facts was agreed to in good
faith and without collusion: Id.
WITNESS.

-How Impeached.-The law does not presume that a person of mature
age whose general character has been notoriously bad, up to within a
period of five years, has reformed, so as to have acquired an unimpeachable reputation, since that time. Reformation may be shown in answer
to the attack, but the law will not presume.it in advance: Rathbun v.
Ross, 46 Barb.
On the trial of a cause, a party offered to prove the general character
of a witness when he resided in the town of A., by a person who had
knew him there, some five years before the trial. The evidence was
objected to, on the ground that the witness sought to be impeached had
had a fixed residence in another place, for the last three or four years,
and that the evidence should be directed to his present character, at the
place of his present residence: Beld that a decision excluding the evidence was clearly erroneous: Id.
A party cannot prove by a witness himself, and by other, parol testimony, that the witness has been convicted of a felony and sent to the
state prison. The record is the best evidence in such a case: Id.
Parol evidence to prove that a witness has been an inmate of a state
prison, is not admissible, that not being evidence of general character,
but of some particular fact, which can never be resorted to by a party
attacking the credibility of a witness: 1d.
Competenc* -Interest.-A grantor in a deed containing covenants for
title, is not a competent witness on- behalf of the plaintiff- in ejectment,
who relies upon the deed to prove its execution. He has a disqualifying
interest in the result of the suit: Hamilton v. Doolittle et al., 87 Ills.
In such a case the grantor-would not be called against his interest; it
would be to his interest to maintain the title which he had covenanted
to make good: Id.
Such a grantor is for the same reason incompetent to prove that he
gave notice to a subsequent purchaser, that he had already sold and conveyed the land to another person : Id.

